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Imagining Fictitious Childhood
Events: The Role of Individual
Differences in Imagination
Inflation
Robert Horselenberg, Harald Merckelbach,
Peter Muris, Eric Rassin, Madelon Sijsenaar and
Victor Spaan
Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Imagination inflation refers to the phenomenon that imagining a low
probability childhood event promotes subjective confidence that the
event actually happened. The present article describes two studies that
addressed the issue of whether imagination inflation is related to certain
personality characteristics (i.e. social desirability, imagery ability, and
dissociation). In Study 1, students (N  34) rated the probability of 60
childhood events. Four weeks later, they came to the laboratory and
were asked to imagine four low-probability childhood events. Next,
new confidence ratings of target (i.e. imagined) and control items were
collected. Students also completed measures of social desirability, ima-
gery ability, and dissociation. While a higher percentage of increased
confidence ratings was found for target items than for control items,
the size of this imagination inflation effect was modest. Only imagery
ability was found to be related to imagination inflation in that indi-
viduals with better imagery abilities displayed a larger imagination
inflation effect. The procedure of Study 2 (N  45) closely followed that
of Study 1, except that imagination of target items now had to be
written down. Writing about a fictitious event generated a straight-
forward imagination inflation phenomenon, but this was not related to
any of the personality characteristics. The discussion focuses on the
extent to which imagination inflation may model therapy-induced false
memories. Copyright C 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
In their often cited study, Garry et al. (1996)
claimed that pseudomemories might develop as a
result of a simple imagination instruction. Garry
and colleagues had participants rate the probability
 Correspondence to: Robert Horselenberg, Department of
Psychology, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD,
Maastricht, The Netherlands. E-mail: R.Horselenberg@
Psychology.Unimaas.nl
of a large number of possible childhood experi-
ences. Next, the authors selected events that
received low subjective probability ratings. Two
weeks later, participants were asked to create
detailed images of some of these low-probability
events. Finally, participants again rated how con-
fident they were that the events had happened
to them. Imagination of the low-probability items
produced an increased confidence that these events
did happen, a phenomenon that the authors
termed imagination inflation.
Imagination Inflation
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According to Garry et al. (1996; see also Paddock
et al., 1998; Heaps and Nash, 1999), imagination
inflation can best be interpreted in terms of a
source-monitoring disruption. By this view,
imagining a fictitious event increases familiarity
with that event. To the extent that this increased
familiarity is misattributed to the authenticity of
the event, source-monitoring problems arise (John-
son, 1988; Koehler, 1991; Goff and Roediger, 1998),
which may promote the subjective probability of
imagined events.
In discussing the implication of their findings,
Garry et al. (1996, p. 214) note that ‘when a mental
health professional repeatedly encourages a client
to imagine an abusive childhood event, these
imagination activities may unknowingly promote
a greater belief that particular episodes occurred.
The search for fact may create a fiction’. Two recent
studies succeeded in replicating the imagination
inflation phenomenon in undergraduate students
(Paddock et al., 1998; Heaps and Nash, 1999). While
this suggests that imagination inflation is a robust
phenomenon, a number of issues can be raised that
have to do with the origins and magnitude of this
phenomenon. To begin with, it remains to be seen
whether source-monitoring failures provide the
most plausible explanation for imagination
inflation. More specifically, one could argue that
inflation of subjective confidence subsequent to
imagination instructions is a function of par-
ticipants’ sensitivity to demand characteristics, i.e.
their tendency to exhibit socially-desirable
responses. This point is important because the
literature on eyewitness memory suggests that
acceptance of misleading information might be
related to participants’ eagerness to cooperate with
the perceived purpose of the study (see for a
review, Winograd et al., 1998). While it is true that
recent experiments on individual differences in
memory illusions failed to detect a connection
between social desirability and memory distortion
(Wilkinson and Hyman, 1998; Winograd et al.,
1998), to the present authors’ knowledge, none of
the published imagination inflation studies looked
at the potential influence of social desirability.
Thus, the current studies sought to examine to
what extent the magnitude of the imagination
inflation phenomenon depends on participants’
social desirability tendencies.
Secondly, inspired by previous work showing
that people with stronger dissociative tendencies
and/or better imagery abilities are more sus-
ceptible to develop pseudomemories in response to
misleading prompts, recent imagination inflation
studies have looked at trait dimensions related to
dissociation and imagery vividness. Whereas these
studies found dissociative tendencies to be posi-
tively and significantly correlated with imagination
inflation (Paddock et al., 1998; Heaps and Nash,
1999), no evidence was found to suggest that indi-
vidual differences in imagery vividness modulates
this phenomenon (Heaps and Nash, 1999).
However, the connection between dissociation and
imagination inflation reported by Heaps and Nash
(1999) and Paddock et al. (1998) needs to be repli-
cated. For one thing, correlations between dis-
sociation and imagination inflation were only
moderate (r  0.34 and r  0.32, respectively).
Also, the Heaps and Nash (1999) study relied on a
non-standard instrument for measuring dis-
sociative tendencies, while Paddock et al.’s (1998)
findings are difficult to interpret because these
authors correlated dissociative tendencies with
residual imagination scores produced by a mul-
tiple regression analysis.
A third issue is that Garry et al. (1996) describe
their findings in terms of percentages of participants
with increased confidence ratings for imagined and
control items. While the percentage of participants
with increased confidence was reliably greater for
imagined than for control items, it is not clear what
the magnitude of this increased confidence was in
terms of scale points. The replicational studies by
Paddock et al. (1998, experiments 1 and 2) are sub-
ject to the same limitation. On the other hand,
Heaps and Nash (1999) reported both percentages
of participants with increased confidence and
increases in scale points. For both parameters, sig-
nificant imagination inflation effects were found,
yet effect sizes seemed to be more substantial for
percentages than for scale points (0.68 versus 0.44).
Obviously, the hypothesis that imagining fictitious
events may elicit pseudomemories about these
events would gain in strength if it could be shown
that imaginative activities produce large shifts on
subjective confidence scales.
A fourth issue is whether imagination inflation
effects are restricted to those situations in which
participants engage in covert (i.e. silent) imagin-
ation of low probability events. More specifically,
the question arises whether such effects may also
be obtained with more therapeutically relevant
techniques such as writing exercises.
With the aforementioned issues in mind, the pre-
sent studies explored whether imagination
inflation phenomena are related to certain per-
sonality traits (i.e. social desirability, imagery
ability, and dissociation). In addition, an attempt
R. Horselenberg et al.
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was made to determine the magnitude of this
phenomenon in terms of scale point shifts. In Study
1, the imagination procedure closely followed that
of Garry et al. (1996). In Study 2, a writing pro-
cedure was employed to elicit imagination
inflation.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
The final sample (see below) consisted of 34 psy-
chology undergraduates (29 women) who vol-
unteered to participate in study 1. Their mean age
was 20 years (SD  4.4 years; range: 17–43 years).
Participants were paid for their participation.
Materials
A translated and adapted version of Garry et
al.’s (1996) Life Events Inventory (LEI) was used in
the current study. This LEI version (a  0.82) lists
60 items each describing a discrete childhood event
that could have happened. Examples are: ‘Broke a
window with my hand’, and ‘Found a silver ring’.
Respondents indicated on 7-point Likert scales
how confident they were that the events happened
to them before the age of 10 years (1  ‘definitely
did not happen’; 7  ‘definitely did happen’). Par-
ticipants also completed widely used Dutch trans-
lations of the Social Desirability Scale (SDS;
Crowne and Marlow, 1964), the Questionnaire
upon Mental Imagery (QMI; Sheehan, 1967), and
the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein
and Putnam, 1986).
The SDS (a  0.36) consists of 33 true/false items
(e.g. ‘I never hesitate to help someone who is in
distress’) and is commonly used to measure the
tendency to provide socially desirable responses
across many situations. The low Cronbach alpha
reflects the relatively broad range of situations that
the SDS samples.
The QMI (a  0.91) is a 35-item self-report
instrument that aims at measuring individual dif-
ferences in imagery ability. Examples are ‘How
vividly and lively can you imagine the taste of salt’
and ‘How vividly and lively can you imagine the
sensation of a soar throat’. Participants indicate on
7-point Likert scales (1  ‘as perfectly clear as true’;
7  ‘I think about it, but I cannot imagine it’) how
vividly and lively they can imagine each item. A
low overall score implies excellent imagery ability.
The DES (a  0.93) consists of 28 items that per-
tain to dissociative phenomena (e.g. feelings of
derealization, depersonalization, disturbances in
memory). Respondents indicate on 100-mm Visual
Analogue Scales (VASs: 0  ‘not at all’; 100  ‘very
much’) the frequency with which they experience
these symptoms. Scores on the individual items are
averaged to obtain a total DES score. The higher
the total DES score, the stronger the dissociative
tendencies.
Procedure
Eighty-two psychology undergraduates at Maa-
stricht University completed the LEI. Next, a selec-
tion of items and participants was made. First,
mean confidence score per item (N  60) on the
LEI was calculated and only those items that had
average scores between 2 and 4 were selected.
Additionally, only participants who did not have
the maximum score (7) on one of the selected items
were invited to participate in the experiment. This
procedure resulted in a pool of eight LEI events
and 34 participants. The experiment proper took
place 4 weeks after LEI (LEI1) data had been col-
lected during regular classes.
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants com-
pleted the SDS. Next, they were told that the
experiment was about individual differences in
imagery ability. This was followed by an imagin-
ation task that involved four pre-selected LEI items
(e.g. ‘You found a beautiful silver ring’). The other
four selected items served as control items (see
below). Imagination and control items were
counterbalanced across participants. That is,
imagination items of one half of the participants
served as control items for the other half and vice
versa. Imagination instructions given to the par-
ticipants closely followed those of Garry et al.
(1996). Thus, the experimenter introduced each
imagination item by reading a few sentences
describing the context of the event (e.g. ‘You’re
playing outside the house. Your mother just told
you that within half an hour, dinner will be
ready’). Participants were given 20 to 60 s to
imagine this context. Subsequently, they answered
a set of questions that pertained to their imagin-
ations (e.g. ‘With whom are you playing?’; ‘Is it
evening?’). The purpose of these questions was to
encourage participants to elaborate their fantasy.
The experimenter then read the pertinent part of
the event that corresponded to the selected LEI
item (e.g. ‘As you are playing outside, your atten-
tion is attracted by a glistening object lying on the
ground. You pick it up; it’s a beautiful silver ring’)
and participants were again instructed to imagine
Imagination Inflation
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this as completely as possible. Following this, par-
ticipants answered some questions about the event
(e.g. ‘What will you do with the ring’). Each of
the four imagination items was subjected to this
procedure. Next, participants completed the QMI
and DES. Finally, participants filled out the original
LEI (LEI2). When a subject noticed that s/he had
already completed this list, the experimenter said
that the other LEI (LEI1) had been lost.
Data Analysis
Changes in subjective confidence from LEI1
(baseline) to LEI2 (post-experimental) for the
imagination items were compared to those for mat-
ched control items. This was done in three different
ways. First, the approach of Garry et al. (1996)
was followed which consists of calculating for each
imagination and control item the percentage of
participants with increased, decreased, or
unchanged probability ratings. Second, as this
approach is not informative about the magnitude
of subjective probability changes, a 2 (LEI1 versus
LEI2)2 (imagination versus control items) analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA), with both factors being
repeated measures, was performed on the sub-
jective probability data. Third, Pearson product–
moment correlations were computed between
imagination inflation effects and individual dif-
ference measures (i.e. SDS, QMI, and DES).
Results
Figure 1 shows percentages of participants with
increased, decreased, and unchanged subjective
probability ratings for imagination and control
items. Paired t-tests (with items as cases) revealed
no difference between imagination and control
items with regard to percentage decreased ratings
(t(7)  1.0). However, percentage of unchanged
ratings were higher for control items than for
imagined items (t(7)  1.90, p  0.05). In
Figure 1. Mean percentages of participants (N  34) with
decreased, unchanged, and increased probability ratings
for control and imagination items
Table 1. Mean subjective probability scores of par-
ticipants (N  34) on pre- and post-experimental imagin-
ation and control items of the life event inventory (LEI).
Standard deviations are given in parentheses
Imagination items Control items
LEI1 2.42 (0.85) 2.43 (1.01)
LEI2 2.79 (0.95) 2.70 (0.74)
LEI1 is pre-experimental LEI; LEI2 is post-experimental LEI.
addition, imagination items tended to have a
higher percentage of increased confidence ratings
than control items. While this difference reached
only borderline significance (t(7)  1.62, p  0.07),
the effect size was large (r  0.52) and cor-
responded to that reported by others (e.g. Clancy
et al., 2000).
Mean probability ratings for imagination and
control items on LEI1 and LEI2 are shown in Table
1. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect
of LEI (F(1,33)  7.21, p  0.01), which indicates
a robust repetition effect. That is, irrespective of
imagination, asking twice about the same events
increased the subjective probability of these events.
Neither the main effect of imagination, nor the
critical interaction of LEI and imagination reached
significance: both Fs (1,33)  1.0. Thus, the
ANOVA yielded no evidence for an imagination
inflation effect in terms of scale point shifts.
Mean scores on the SDS, DES, and QMI were
16.0 (SD  4.2), 25.0 (SD  14.1), and 88.9
(SD  22.8), respectively. It should be noted that
these means are quite similar to the mean scores
of undergraduate samples reported in other stud-
ies (e.g. Hyman and Billings, 1998; Aleman et al.,
1999; Merckelbach et al., 2000). In order to explore
possible links between these measures and imagin-
ation inflation, an index of imagination inflation
was calculated by subtracting the change in ratings
on control items from that on imagination items.
This index provides the best estimate of imagin-
ation inflation as it controls for repetition effects.
Next, Pearson product–moment correlations were
computed between imagination inflation and per-
sonality traits. There was no correlation between
imagination inflation and the tendency to give soci-
ally-desirable answers (r  0.04). Neither was there
a connection between imagination inflation and
dissociative tendencies (r  0.03). The only cor-
relation that attained significance was that between
imagination inflation and imagery ability:
r  0.34, p  0.05. Note that the correlation was
in the expected direction. That is, the higher the
R. Horselenberg et al.
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imagery ability (i.e. lower QMI scores), the stron-
ger the imagination inflation effect.
DISCUSSION
The results of Study 1 can be summarized as
follows. To begin with, the imagination inflation
phenomenon described by Garry et al. (1996) was
partially replicated. That is, the percentage of par-
ticipants with increased subjective probability rat-
ings tended to be higher for imagination items than
for control items, while the percentage of
unchanged probability ratings was higher for con-
trol than for imagination items. Second, when the
magnitude of this effect (i.e. mean scale point chan-
ges rather than percentages of participants with
increased confidence ratings) was taken into
account, no convincing evidence for an imagin-
ation inflation phenomenon was found. At this
level of analysis, only a repetition effect attained
significance irrespective of the imagination
manipulation, participants gave higher subjective
probability ratings on the post-experimental LEI
(LEI2) than on the pre-experimental LEI (LEI1).
Third, at the within-subjects level, imagination
inflation was not related to social desirability or
dissociative tendencies. Yet, there was a significant
though modest connection between imagery ability
and imagination inflation.
In line with previous studies (Garry et al., 1996;
Paddock et al., 1998; Heaps and Nash, 1999), the
current results indicate that imagining low-prob-
ability events enhances confidence that the events
had in fact occurred. Meanwhile, the magnitude of
this effect appears to be small when one looks at
scale point shifts rather than percentages of par-
ticipants. This is reminiscent of Heaps and Nash’s
(1999) finding that effect sizes of imagination
inflation are higher for percentages than for scale
values. Does this mean that the practical (e.g. clini-
cal) implications of imagination inflation are lim-
ited? Not necessarily. One could argue that
imagination inflation, though fairly tame in the
laboratory, might conceivably create powerful
effects in those clinical settings where imagination
exercises are carried out repeatedly and are aimed
at ambiguous autobiographical events. Support for
this line of reasoning comes from recent work of
Goff and Roediger (1998). These authors noted that
when participants imagine performing actions (e.g.
‘bounce the ball’), they subsequently remember
that they had actually carried out these actions and
this effect increases with the number of imagin-
ation exercises.
The present data show that shifts in subjective
confidence ratings of imagination items are not
controlled by social desirability tendencies. This
makes an interpretation of imagination inflation in
terms of demand characteristics and social desir-
ability less likely. In contrast, imagery vividness
was found to be linked to imagination inflation.
While this result is difficult to reconcile with Heaps
and Nash’s (1999) failure to detect an association
between imagery ability and imagination inflation
(r  0.06), it is in line with earlier studies show-
ing that individuals with vivid imagery are more
likely to make source-monitoring errors (Dobson
and Markham, 1993) and to produce false rec-
ognition responses on word list tasks (Wilkinson
and Hyman, 1998; Winograd et al., 1998). In more
general terms, these studies converge upon the
notion that persons with good imaginary abilities
are more susceptible to memory illusions.
Unlike previous imagination inflation studies
(Paddock et al., 1998; Heaps and Nash, 1999), we
were unable to find a correlation between dis-
sociative tendencies and imagination inflation. We
have no obvious explanation for this discrepancy,
except that, as noted in the Introduction, previous
studies reported relatively moderate correlations
and relied on operationalizations of dissociation
and imagination inflation that are not particularly
straightforward. As an aside, it should be noted
that in the domain of memory illusions, a number
of close-up studies specifically addressed the con-
nection between dissociation and pseudo-
memories. Many of them failed to find such a
connection between these two parameters (e.g.
Platt et al., 1998; Mazzoni et al., 1999; Spanos et
al., 1999). Perhaps then, dissociative tendencies are
only a weak predictor of memory illusions and it
requires considerable statistical power to dem-
onstrate such a connection.
The question arises why the imagination
inflation phenomenon found in the present study
remained a moderate effect. There are two possible
reasons for this. First, participants’ imaginations
were based on scenarios developed by the
researchers. From a social-psychological point of
view, such an approach cannot be expected to
induce strong commitments of participants to their
imaginations. Writing about a fictitious event
might provide a much stronger manipulation (e.g.
Spanos, 1996). A second factor that may have con-
tributed to the fragile nature of the imagination
inflation effect found in Study 1 is that the post-
Imagination Inflation
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experimental LEI items were identical to the base-
line LEI items. To the extent that participants want
to make a consistent impression in their answers
to the LEI items, this may have counteracted
imagination inflation effects.
With these two issues in mind, Study 2 was
conducted. Study 2 relied on an imagination
inflation task that required a more active involve-
ment of the participant. More specifically, a writing
exercise was used. Thus, participants were
instructed to write brief, but plausible stories about
low-probability LEI events. Next, participants com-
pleted a post-experimental LEI (LEI2) that also
included paraphrased versions of the pre-exper-
imental imagination items. These additional items
were included to reduce consistency tendencies.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
Forty-five participants (30 women) participated
in Study 2. Their mean age was 17 years (SD  1.1
years; range: 16–20 years). Some participants were
psychology undergraduates, but the majority of
them were high school students recruited through
advertisement in a local paper. Participants
received a small financial compensation for their
participation.
Material
Two weeks before the experiment took place,
participants completed the LEI (a  0.83; see Study
1). For practical reasons, the procedure of cal-
ibrating items for each participant deviated from
that in Study 1. Most importantly, the sample in
Study 2 was too small to allow selection of items
on the basis of excluding participants. Therefore,
items that had an average score between 2 and 4 in
Study 1 were selected (see for a similar procedure,
Paddock et al., 1998). This resulted in a pool of 12
possible imagination items with an average sub-
jective probability rating of 2.2 (SD  1.2). From
this pool, the experimenter selected four imagin-
ation items for each participant individually, using
the criterion that none of the selected imagination
items had a score of 6 or higher for that particular
participant. Selection of control items from the pool
of 48 remaining LEI1 items took place after the
experiment. Control items were matched on mean
pre-experimental subjective probability ratings
assigned to the imagination items. As in Study 1,
participants also completed the SDS (a  0.43),
DES (a  0.95), and QMI (a  0.87).
Procedure
Two weeks after they had completed the LEI at
home (LEI1), participants were invited to come to
the laboratory. Participants were told that the
experimenters were interested in creative writing.
They were encouraged to imagine the pre-selected
items and write their imaginations down. More
specifically, each imagination trial started with a
card on which the pertinent item was printed. The
instruction was as follows: ‘Try to imagine yourself
actually experiencing the event you have just read.
Experience this imaginary event as vividly and
fully as you can. Write your imaginations down
on the piece of paper in front of you. Describe as
vividly and fully as possible all your imaginations’.
This instruction was repeated for each imagination
item. Following the imagination trials, participants
completed the SDS, DES and QMI. Finally, the LEI
was administered for a second time (LEI2). Twelve
items were added to the LEI2. These items were
paraphrases of the 12 potential imagination items
and were positioned in such way that they pre-
ceded the original imagination items. Examples of
paraphrased items are ‘I took something from a
store without paying for it’ (original item: ‘I stole
sweets in a shop’) and ‘I said to my parents that I
didn’t feel good, so I didn’t have to go for a school
exam’ (original item: ‘I pretended to be sick, so I
didn’t have to go to school’). When participants
indicated that they had already completed the LEI,
the experimenter replied that they initially had
received the wrong version of the questionnaire.
Results
Following Garry et al. (1996), percentages of par-
ticipants with increased, decreased, and
unchanged probability ratings were calculated for
imagination and control items, separately.
However, given the different procedure of sel-
ecting imagination and control items, paired t-test
would be inappropriate for the data obtained in
this study. Therefore, chi-square tests were carried
out. Imagination and control items did not differ
with regard to percentage of participants with
decreased probability ratings (18.3 and 20.6%,
respectively; x2(1)  0.28, p  0.69). Yet, imagin-
ation items had a lower percentage of participants
with unchanged ratings than control items (43.9
and 62.2%, respectively; x2(1)  12.15, p  0.001),
while the reverse was true for the percentage of
R. Horselenberg et al.
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Table 2. Mean subjective probability scores of par-
ticipants (N  45) on pre- and post-experimental imagin-
ation, paraphrased imagination items, and control items
of the life event inventory (LEI). Standard deviations are
given in parentheses
Imagination Control Paraphrased
items items imagination items
LEI1 2.20 (0.78) 2.22 (1.21) —
LEI2 2.71 (1.17) 2.20 (1.10) 3.95 (1.02)
LEI1 is pre-experimental LEI; LEI2 is post-experimental LEI.
increased ratings (37.8 and 17.2%, respectively;
x2(1)  19.07, p  0.001).
Average subjective probability ratings for
imagination and control items on LEI1 and LEI2
are shown in Table 2. A 2 (LEI1 versus LEI2)2
(imagination versus control) ANOVA, with both
factors being repeated measures, was performed
on these data. This ANOVA yielded a significant
main effect of imagination (F(1,44)  6.94,
p  0.05). Overall, imagination items had higher
probability ratings than control items. Most impor-
tantly, the critical interaction of LEI and imagin-
ation reached significance (F(1,44)  7.84, p  0.01),
indicating a reliable imagination inflation effect.
There was no significant repetition effect of LEI
(F(1,44)  2.01, p  0.16).
Mean scores on the SDS, DES, and QMI were
highly comparable to those obtained in Study 1:
18.6 (SD  4.4), 16.2 (SD  13.4), and 92.7
(SD  18.6). There was no significant relation
between imagination inflation (calculated as pre-
to post-test changes on imagination items corrected
for repetition effects on control items; see Study 1)
and the tendency to give socially-desirable answers
(r  0.20, p  0.10). Neither was there a con-
nection between imagination inflation and dis-
sociative tendencies (r  0.18). Curiously
enough, the connection between imagination
inflation and imagery ability found in Study 1 was
not replicated in this study (r  0.20).
The right-hand column of Table 2 shows mean
confidence ratings of the paraphrased LEI2 items.
Note that the paraphrased imagination items had
a relatively high mean confidence rating, that is, a
rating that exceeds the midpoint of the scale (i.e.
3.5). Subjective probability ratings of paraphrased
imagination items were higher than those on LEI2
control items (t(44)  9.11, p  0.001) and also
exceeded those on LEI2 imagination items
(t(44)  5.66, p  0.001). These findings suggest
that a straightforward imagination inflation effect
occurred for the paraphrased imagination items.
To explore whether imagination inflation for para-
phrased items was related to SDS, DES, and QMI,
imagination inflation was redefined as confidence
changes from imagination items on LEI1 to para-
phrased items on LEI2 corrected for changes on
control items. However, no significant correlations
were found between imagination inflation defined
in this way and personality characteristics (all rs
0.20, all ps 0.10).
DISCUSSION
The findings of Study 2 can be summarized as
follows. To begin with, writing about a fictitious
event led to a reliable imagination inflation
phenomenon, both in terms of percentages of par-
ticipants with increasing confidence ratings and
mean increases on the 7-point probability scale.
Second, no evidence was found to suggest that
this imagination inflation phenomenon is linked to
social desirability characteristics. Neither were
there indications that the phenomenon is linked to
dissociative tendencies or imagery vividness.
Third, imagination inflation was even more evi-
dent with paraphrased versions of the imagination
items, suggesting that participants’ tendency to
respond in a consistent manner may, indeed,
counteract the imagination inflation phenomenon.
Differences in sample characteristics and item
selection preclude direct comparisons between
Study 1 and Study 2. Nevertheless, results suggest
that Study 2 demonstrated a much stronger version
of the imagination inflation phenomenon than
Study 1. Thus, the present findings support
Spanos’ (1996) claim that writing about fictitious
events may foster subjective confidence in those
events (see also Destun and Kuiper, 1996). But why
would writing about imaginations produce a more
convincing imagination inflation phenomenon
than does the sort of silent imagination exercise
used in Study 1? Two possibilities suggest them-
selves. One is that writing produces a ‘public rec-
ord’ (Spanos, 1996, p. 100). This, in turn, may create
a stronger commitment than the silent imagination
sessions of Study 1. Interestingly, effects of writing
about counter-attitudinal beliefs have been well
researched in social psychology. A number of stud-
ies on cognitive dissonance have demonstrated
that when people are asked to write an essay about
a counter-attitudinal view without being paid for
this, they subsequently express more agreement
with that view (e.g. Cohen, 1962). A second possi-
Imagination Inflation
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bility has to do with a more technical issue, namely
that the imagination procedure followed in Study
1 consisted of prompts formulated by the exper-
imenters, while the procedure of Study 2 was not
structured in this way. Thus, it may well be the
case that the procedure of Study 2 allowed for
more idiosyncratic and, therefore, more plausible
imaginations.
As in Study 1, no evidence was found to support
an interpretation of imagination inflation in terms
of participants’ sensitivity to experimental
demands. In both studies, increases in confidence
for imagination items were not related to par-
ticipants’ SDS scores. Accordingly, it is unlikely
that imagination inflation is an artefact caused by
participants’ tendency to comply with the
demands of the experiment. While Study 1 found
a significant, though modest, connection between
imagery ability and the imagination inflation
phenomenon, such a connection was not replicated
in Study 2. This implies that the correlation
between imagination inflation and imagery viv-
idness is not a robust one. On the other hand,
like Study 1, Study 2 failed to obtain a significant
correlation between dissociative tendencies and
imagination inflation. We return to this issue in the
general discussion.
Study 2 demonstrates that when paraphrased
imagination items are employed, the imagination
inflation effect is not only significant, but also
crosses the midpoint of the confidence scale (i.e.
3.5). Perhaps, then, experimental set-ups that rely
on identical pre- and post-experimental LEIs pro-
duce an underestimation of the imagination
inflation phenomenon. Note, however, that the
post-experimental LEI in the current study did not
include paraphrases of control items. A more rig-
orous test of the idea that identical pre- and post-
experimental LEIs induce consistency tendencies,
thereby reducing imagination inflation effects,
would involve direct comparisons between para-
phrased control and imagination items. One could
argue that the relatively high confidence ratings of
paraphrased imagination items are simply the
result of the fact that these items repeat the content
of standard imagination items of LEI1. This would
imply that the heightened probability ratings on
paraphrases reflect a repetition effect. However,
such an interpretation is flawed on several counts.
First, it leaves unexplained why ratings on para-
phrased items were quite high. The magnitude of
the repetition effects is usually in the order of 0.3
scale points (e.g. Brown and Nix, 1996) which is
considerably smaller than the 1.7 scale points
increase found for paraphrases in the current
study. Another problem with this explanation is
that it is difficult to reconcile with the absence of a
repetition-effect for control items (cf. above). Why
would such an effect become manifest during LEI2
only for paraphrases of imagination items, but not
for control items? After all, control items of LEI2
were identical to control items of LEI1, whereas
paraphrases of LEI2 were just what they were:
paraphrases. A related issue is that the LEI2 was
designed in such a way that paraphrases preceded
the pertinent imagination items. Consequently, an
explanation in terms of repetition effects would
dictate a huge confidence increase for the imagin-
ation items and a relatively small increase for the
paraphrases. Yet, as a matter of fact, the opposite
pattern occurred, which casts doubts on a rep-
etition-effect account.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, the present studies provide sup-
port for the idea that imagining a low-probability
childhood event promotes subjective confidence in
that event. In general, then, the current findings
accord well with those reported by Garry et al.
(1996), Heaps and Nash (1999), Paddock et al.
(1998), and Clancy et al. (2000). It should be added,
though, that the magnitude of this effect remained
small in Study 1. A more convincing effect was
obtained in Study 2, but here imagination was
combined with writing exercises. This suggests
that a single and covert act of imagination results
in robust, but relatively small shifts of subjective
confidence, while huge effects may be produced
by writing imaginations down.
Plainly, the effects of writing an imagination
down bears relevance to clinical settings. Over the
past few years, writing exercises have become a
common treatment intervention for individuals
with traumatic experiences (e.g. Pennebaker, 1993;
see also Littrell, 1998). The beneficial effects of this
intervention on health parameters are well-estab-
lished (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1996). However, writ-
ing exercises have also been advocated as a vehicle
for memory recovery. For example, a survey
among licensed psychotherapists conducted by
Poole et al. (1995) revealed that a considerable per-
centage of surveyed psychotherapists had used
journalling as a technique to help clients recover
memories of sexual abuse. In their scholarly review
on recovered memories, Lindsay and Read (1994,
p. 301) noted that they were ‘particularly con-
R. Horselenberg et al.
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cerned about cases in which the instructions for
journalling suggest that writers should strive for a
non-critical, stream-of-consciousness flow, writing
down whatever comes to mind without stopping
to evaluate it’. The results of Study 2 show that
Lindsay and Read’s concern is not misplaced.
Dissociative tendencies as indexed by the DES
(Bernstein and Putnam, 1986) have been found to
be linked to suggestibility (Merckelbach et al., 1998;
Wolfradt and Meyer, 1998), fantasy proneness
(Rauschenberg and Lynn, 1995; Merckelbach et al.,
1999), and the propensity to develop pseudo-
memories (Hyman and Billings, 1998). There is also
some evidence that dissociative tendencies may be
related to imagination inflation (Paddock et al.,
1998; Heaps and Nash, 1999; Clancy et al., 2000).
From this perspective, it is surprising that the pre-
sent studies failed to obtain significant correlations
between dissociation and imagination inflation. We
can only speculate about the reasons for these null
findings. One possibility is that the relation
between dissociative tendencies and memory dis-
tortions is not as impressive as some authors have
suggested. This position is supported by the fact
that a number of recent studies found no (Platt et
al., 1998; Mazzoni et al., 1999; Spanos et al., 1999)
or only a small (e.g. Eisen and Carlson, 1998) cor-
relations between DES and the tendency to gen-
erate illusory memories. It is hard to escape the
conclusion that broad trait measures of dissociative
tendencies (e.g. DES) and imagery ability (e.g.
QMI) provide only imperfect operationalizations
of source-monitoring decisions involved in dis-
criminating between real and pseudomemories.
Therefore, future studies should carry out more
fine-grained analyses to establish which aspects
(e.g. subscales, factors) of dissociation and imagery
ability tap source-monitoring aspects (see for an
example, Wilkinson and Hyman, 1998).
Another possibility is that imagination inflation
is a metamemory rather than a memory phenom-
enon. That is, it is conceivable that as a result of
imagination exercise(s), people change their belief
about the probability of target items but do not
necessarily develop pseudomemories about these
items. To the extent that individual differences in
dissociation and imagery ability are linked to
pseudomemories rather than metamemory beliefs,
one would not expect to find strong correlations
between imagination inflation and these per-
sonality traits. Clearly, this point warrants further
study.
The present findings along with those of Garry
et al. (1996), Goff and Roediger (1998), Heaps and
Nash (1999), Paddock et al. (1998) and Clancy et
al. (2000) converge on the notion that imagination
inflation is a real phenomenon that bears relevance
to clinical practice. Obviously, the issue of what is
inflated during imagination inflation requires fur-
ther study. In addition, it would be worthwhile
to run parametric studies that examine whether
imagination inflation can, indeed, be maximalized
with paraphrased items. In more general terms, the
precise interplay between imagination inflation,
source-monitoring decisions, and personality
aspects awaits clarification.
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